System Drift Inside the German Welfare State
While in the United States right‑wing politics is openly visible through government action—especially in migration policy—this series reveals a different pattern. In Germany, the welfare state has long been tightening migration policy from within, without any right‑wing government in power. Newly published documents show that this internal drift has produced secret decisions for years. Through these decisions, the administration effectively implements right‑wing demands even before they appear in public debate.
Federal Chancellor Merz is now using this system‑generated drift as a political resource. The drift is not new; it simply provides the justification he needs for his reform. He presents the rise of the Alternative for Germany (AfD) as proof that Germany requires “stricter rules.” In his narrative, the reform becomes a response to the AfD and a strategy to win back voters who turned to them. In reality, the tightening he promotes has long been central to the AfD’s agenda. What had been carried out quietly within the system is now brought onto the public stage.
Consider the case of IKK classic, a health insurance fund within the German welfare state—internationally presented as part of a “model” social system—that destroyed my economic foundation. The fund forced me to lose my company in the fashion sector in 2022, 2023, and 2024, leaving me unable to support myself. Over the same period, IKK classic financed doctors who repeatedly and drastically reduced the medication that replaces thyroid function—a life‑sustaining drug. The result was four consecutive emergency admissions in two Berlin hospitals.
Economically and medically, such a situation inevitably forces a person to apply for social benefits. Or: remigration. The first strengthens the growth of AfD support; the second fulfills a central AfD objective.
Merz publicly claims that the welfare state is no longer financially viable. To support this narrative, he demands extensive cuts and pushes for stricter rules. His agenda includes a fundamental restructuring of the system and tighter regulations for Bürgergeld. He also seeks to increase pressure on the unemployed and further restrict migration. This is a political tightening, not a technical reform. It inevitably leads to remigration—because without income and without social benefits, people have no choice. Above all, the tightening aligns precisely with what the AfD aims to achieve.
Since October 2024, the IKK classic case was first before the Administrative Court of Berlin, and from May 2025 onward, the lawsuit against IKK classic was pending before the Social Court. Only in October 2025, after I had temporarily been in Albania, did the Social Court unexpectedly announce that the case might not be the one forwarded by the Administrative Court—even though both IKK classic and the Administrative Court had explicitly stated that the Social Court was responsible. By that time, the lawsuit had already been pending there for several months. To this day, almost a year later, IKK classic has not submitted a response, and there is not even a decision on whether they must respond at all. These delays show that even the enforcement of basic rights is being obstructed.
An “isolated incident” cannot last four years, pass through two court levels, remain unanswered for months, repeat medical misjudgments over several years, destroy an economic foundation, and display the same administrative patterns throughout. Such a sequence is not an exception. It is a structural pattern becoming visible within the system.
This narrative obscures the actual truth: the welfare state is not the problem—the ideology embedded deep within its administration is.
The IKK classic case, which I examine in this series, stands as an example of an ideology that operates deep inside the administrative system. Across the welfare state, many health insurers and authorities follow the same patterns. They ignore evidence, shift responsibility, delay decisions, and create hardships that push people into existential crises. The impact falls disproportionately on people with a migration background, who have fewer institutional resources and less access to corrective mechanisms. In the end, individuals are pushed into social benefits or—as in my case—into de facto remigration.
This internal tightening not only destroys lives; it also generates costs. People who become ill due to administrative failures, lose their ability to work, or see their businesses collapse inevitably end up dependent on social benefits. Others who can no longer pay contributions because institutions have destroyed their economic foundation burden the system twice. And anyone who would need to take legal action faces yet another barrier: legal aid is uncertain, slow, and inaccessible for many.
The result is a paradoxical outcome: the administration produces exactly the social and financial burdens that right‑wing politics later uses as justification for further tightening. The system’s internal shift creates the crisis. Politics sells the crisis as the reason for the shift.