From Mossadegh (1953) to Khamenei (2026): Two Overthrows, One Geopolitical Pattern

Side‑by‑side portraits of Mohammad Mossadegh (overthrown 1953) and Ali Khamenei (killed 2026), shown in a horizontal montage.

On February 28, 2026, Iran’s Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei was kil­led in one of the lar­gest U.S.–Israeli strikes in deca­des. Both govern­ments sta­ted that Khamenei was “almost cer­tain­ly dead,” and Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu was shown a pho­to­graph of his reco­ver­ed body. According to Reuters, the strike invol­ved up to thir­ty precision‑guided bombs that des­troy­ed seve­ral buil­dings in his com­pound. President Donald Trump declared that Khamenei was “one of the most mali­cious peo­p­le in histo­ry” and “had no chan­ce of esca­ping our sur­veil­lan­ce system.”

As explo­si­ons lit up the night sky over Tehran, the Iranian govern­ment announ­ced for­ty days of natio­nal mour­ning. Across the regi­on, the reac­tion was imme­dia­te and vola­ti­le: mass pro­tests erupt­ed in Iran, Pakistan, and Iraq; demons­tra­tors in Karachi attempt­ed to storm the U.S. con­su­la­te. Iran respon­ded with mis­sile strikes on Israel and seve­ral Gulf sta­tes hos­ting U.S. bases. Within hours, the Middle East stood on the edge of a regio­nal firestorm.

Yet as dra­ma­tic as this moment is, it does not repre­sent a break with the past. Instead, it marks the con­ti­nua­tion of a geo­po­li­ti­cal pat­tern that has shaped world poli­tics for more than seven­ty years—a pat­tern that today feels more dan­ge­rous than ever. Since the end of World War II, one prin­ci­ple has repea­ted­ly struc­tu­red the inter­na­tio­nal order: the United States deci­des who may govern a coun­try, and who may not. This has taken dif­fe­rent forms over time—sometimes through coups, some­ti­mes through sanc­tions, some­ti­mes through covert ope­ra­ti­ons, and some­ti­mes through open war.

This pat­tern per­sists not only becau­se of American mili­ta­ry power but also becau­se of America’s insti­tu­tio­nal posi­ti­on. As a per­ma­nent mem­ber of the UN Security Council, the United States holds a veto that can block any resolution—even one sup­port­ed by the enti­re inter­na­tio­nal com­mu­ni­ty. The veto shields U.S. inter­ven­ti­ons from inter­na­tio­nal scru­ti­ny and turns regime chan­ge into a poli­ti­cal tool wit­hout consequences.

Ironically, this long arc of inter­ven­ti­on beg­ins exact­ly whe­re it reap­pears in 2026: in Iran.

1953—The Overthrow of Mossadegh: The Beginning of the Pattern

The modern cycle of U.S.‑backed regime chan­ge does not begin with a dic­ta­tor. It beg­ins with a demo­cra­ti­cal­ly elec­ted refor­mer. Mohammad Mossadegh, Iran’s prime minis­ter from 1951 to 1953, was a jurist, par­lia­men­ta­ri­an, and one of the most popu­lar poli­ti­cal figu­res of his era. He was elec­ted by the 16th Majlis and reaf­firm­ed by the 17th Majlis in 1952. His legi­ti­ma­cy was unquestionable—and that made him dan­ge­rous to tho­se who con­trol­led Iran’s resources.

Mossadegh was not an ideo­lo­gue. Instead, he was an Iranian natio­na­list who belie­ved that a sove­reign sta­te must con­trol its own resour­ces. His govern­ment intro­du­ced swee­ping social and eco­no­mic reforms: a natio­nal social insu­rance sys­tem, land redis­tri­bu­ti­on to wea­k­en the power of lar­ge lan­dow­ners, and new taxa­ti­on mea­su­res such as a land‑lease tax. These reforms were not desi­gned to pro­vo­ke the West; rather, they were inten­ded to moder­ni­ze Iran and streng­then its sovereignty.

The tur­ning point came with the natio­na­liza­ti­on of Iran’s oil indus­try. Since 1913, the British‑owned Anglo‑Persian Oil Company (later BP) had con­trol­led Iran’s oil fields, extra­c­ting enorm­ous pro­fits while Iran recei­ved only a frac­tion. Mossadegh ended this arran­ge­ment, decla­ring that Iran’s oil belon­ged to the Iranian peo­p­le. Inside Iran, this was cele­bra­ted as an act of natio­nal digni­ty. In London, it was a geo­po­li­ti­cal shock. In Washington, it was a stra­te­gic thre­at. Consequently, both govern­ments feared that other nati­ons might fol­low Iran’s example.

In 1953, the British MI6 and the CIA, led by Kermit Roosevelt Jr., orchestra­ted Operation Ajax—a coup that over­th­rew Mossadegh. The ope­ra­ti­on reli­ed on bri­be­ry, psy­cho­lo­gi­cal war­fa­re, street mobi­liza­ti­on, and direct mili­ta­ry mani­pu­la­ti­on. As a result, Mossadegh was arres­ted, tried for tre­ason, sen­ten­ced to three years in pri­son, and then pla­ced under house arrest until his death in 1967.

After the coup, Shah Mohammad Reza Pahlavi con­so­li­da­ted his power. In 1954, a new oil con­sor­ti­um agree­ment divi­ded Iran’s oil pro­duc­tion among Western com­pa­nies until 1979. Meanwhile, the CIA gai­ned unrest­ric­ted access to Iran, and poli­ti­cal oppo­si­ti­on was sys­te­ma­ti­cal­ly crus­hed. A demo­cra­ti­cal­ly elec­ted lea­der who gover­ned for his coun­try was repla­ced by an aut­ho­ri­ta­ri­an ruler who gover­ned for Western interests.

The Mossadegh case reve­als the core logic that con­ti­nues through 2026: tho­se who pro­tect natio­nal resour­ces are remo­ved, while tho­se who pro­tect Western inte­rests are sup­port­ed. In this pat­tern, demo­cra­cy beco­mes irrele­vant, sove­reig­n­ty is nego­tia­ble, and inter­na­tio­nal law is optio­nal. Ultimately, the pat­tern does not begin with tyrants—it beg­ins with a demo­cra­tic reformer.

The Continuation of the Pattern: Guatemala, Vietnam, Chile, Panama, Iraq, Libya, Venezuela

The pat­tern resur­faced repea­ted­ly across con­ti­nents in the deca­des that fol­lo­wed. In 1954, the United States hel­ped over­throw Guatemala’s pre­si­dent, Jacobo Árbenz, after his land reforms threa­ten­ed U.S. cor­po­ra­te inte­rests. Two years later, Washington blo­cked nati­on­wi­de elec­tions in Vietnam becau­se Ho Chi Minh was cer­tain to win; by 1963, it sup­port­ed the coup that kil­led Ngo Dinh Diem. The cycle con­tin­ued in 1973 with U.S. back­ing for the mili­ta­ry over­throw of Chile’s demo­cra­ti­cal­ly elec­ted pre­si­dent, Salvador Allende. In 1989, American forces inva­ded Panama, depo­sed Manuel Noriega, and trans­por­ted him to the United States. By con­trast, the 2003 inva­si­on of Iraq topp­led Saddam Hussein under the pre­text of wea­pons of mass des­truc­tion, and sub­se­quent­ly, NATO’s 2011 inter­ven­ti­on resul­ted in the over­throw and death of Muammar Gaddafi. Most recent­ly, in 2026, Nicolás Maduro was detai­ned during a U.S. ope­ra­ti­on in Venezuela.

The Structural Constants of U.S.‑Backed Regime Change

The United States defi­nes who is a “tyrant”—not the UN, not inter­na­tio­nal law. Moral labe­l­ing replaces legal pro­cess. Those labe­led tyrants may be over­thrown, abduc­ted, or kil­led. The United States acts wit­hout UN aut­ho­riza­ti­on and blocks any con­dem­na­ti­on with its veto. Populations bear the consequences—never the poli­ti­cal eli­te. The methods grow more extre­me: from covert coups to inva­si­ons, from dro­ne war­fa­re to the tar­ge­ted kil­ling of a sit­ting head of sta­te. And the con­se­quen­ces beco­me glo­bal: oil pri­ces sur­ge, tan­kers halt, OPEC+ adjus­ts pro­duc­tion, Gulf sta­tes report casu­al­ties, and mar­kets react.

The death of Ali Khamenei is not an iso­la­ted event. It is the con­ti­nua­tion of a seventy‑year pat­tern in which the United States deter­mi­nes who may govern—and who must fall. From Mossadegh in 1953 to Khamenei in 2026, the line is unmist­aka­ble: regime chan­ge is not an excep­ti­on. It is a system.

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