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Russia’s Record Drone War on Ukraine: A New Peak in the 2026 Air Offensive

Kyiv, Ukraine at night during a total blackout in winter 2024, with dark silhouettes of high-rise residential buildings around a lake and only a few scattered lights visible, illustrating the impact of Russian attacks on the power grid and the vulnerability of civilian urban life in wartime.
Kyiv during a blackout in November 2024. Russia’s intensified drone and missile strikes in early 2026 are again targeting Ukraine’s power grid and cities, pushing the country into one of the most intense phases of the air war since the invasion began.

While Washington is try­ing to force Iran into a ceas­e­fi­re with a swee­ping 15‑point plan and fresh troop deploy­ments to the Middle East, Moscow is pushing its own war to a new peak over Ukraine. In the same win­ter of 202526 in which the US‑Iran con­flict escala­tes, Russia is laun­ching record num­bers of dro­nes and mis­siles at Ukrainian cities, tur­ning the air war into one of the most inten­se pha­ses sin­ce the inva­si­on began.

Since ear­ly 2026, Russian air attacks on Ukraine have inten­si­fied shar­ply, and the win­ter of 202526 now stands out as a tur­ning point in the air war. February 2026 mark­ed a clear tur­ning point: accor­ding to Ukrainian data, Russia laun­ched seve­ral thousand Shahed‑type attack dro­nes and hundreds of mis­siles in a sin­gle month, more than in any recent month of the full‑scale inva­si­on. Many nights saw lar­ge-sca­le strike packa­ges in which hundreds of dro­nes and mis­siles were laun­ched within hours. Targets were not limi­t­ed to the front lines; they repea­ted­ly included power and ener­gy infra­struc­tu­re, resi­den­ti­al dis­tricts, hos­pi­tals and his­to­ric city cen­ters. February the­r­e­fo­re beca­me a record month in a cam­paign cle­ar­ly aimed at exhaus­ting both Ukraine’s air defen­ses and its civi­li­an infrastructure.

In late March, this escala­ti­on rea­ched a new, cle­ar­ly dis­cer­ni­ble peak. Within rough­ly a 24‑hour peri­od bet­ween March 23 and 24, Russia laun­ched near­ly 1,000 attack dro­nes against Ukrainian ter­ri­to­ry in one of the lar­gest aeri­al assaults of the full‑scale war. In the first night, clo­se to 400 dro­nes were recor­ded; the fol­lo­wing day brought an unu­sual­ly lar­ge day­ti­me bar­ra­ge with more than 500 dro­nes, and in the next night ano­ther wave of around 150 dro­nes fol­lo­wed. These strikes hit, among other places, a mate­r­ni­ty hos­pi­tal in the wes­tern Ivano‑Frankivsk regi­on, apart­ment blocks and city cen­ters across seve­ral regi­ons, and parts of the old town of Lviv, inclu­ding a buil­ding belon­ging to a monas­tery com­plex that forms part of a UNESCO‑protected heri­ta­ge site. At least seven peo­p­le were kil­led and more than 50 woun­ded, inclu­ding child­ren, and major fires bro­ke out in Lviv and other cities. Observers descri­be this series as one of the lar­gest strike waves sin­ce the inva­si­on began.

From the Ukrainian per­spec­ti­ve, this chan­ges the cha­rac­ter of the war. Cities in the west that were long per­cei­ved as rela­tively safe, such as Lviv or Ivano‑Frankivsk, have now beco­me regu­lar tar­gets of sys­te­ma­tic dro­ne attacks. The psy­cho­lo­gi­cal effect is obvious: air-raid sirens over almost the enti­re coun­try, very few genui­ne “rear are­as” whe­re civi­li­ans, hos­pi­tals or logi­stics can ope­ra­te wit­hout con­stant thre­at. At the same time, pres­su­re on Ukraine’s air defen­se is gro­wing, as it has to split limi­t­ed sys­tems bet­ween front-line sec­tors, ener­gy infra­struc­tu­re and urban cen­ters deep in the inte­ri­or and in the west.

The time­line sin­ce January 2026 reve­als a clear pat­tern. The fre­quen­cy and inten­si­ty of Russian air strikes increase, February sets a record, and in late March a fur­ther spike in a very short peri­od fol­lows. From a mili­ta­ry point of view, Russia appears to be pur­suing seve­ral objec­ti­ves at once. Continuous high strike volu­mes and clo­se­ly spa­ced waves are desi­gned to wear down Ukraine’s air defen­ses; at the same time, not only the east but also cen­tral and wes­tern Ukraine are kept under near‑permanent thre­at, put­ting almost the enti­re coun­try under sus­tained pres­su­re. In par­al­lel, Russia has step­ped up its ground offen­si­ve in the east, inclu­ding around Kramatorsk, Kostyantynivka and Lyman, so the air strikes can be read as part of a broa­der spring offensive.

Politically, this escala­ti­on is taking place under the pro­tec­tion of Russia’s veto in the UN Security Council. Moscow has repea­ted­ly vet­oed reso­lu­ti­ons that sought to con­demn its actions in Ukraine or impo­se bin­ding mea­su­res. A sin­gle veto from a per­ma­nent mem­ber is enough to block Security Council action. The result is a situa­ti­on in which mas­si­ve dro­ne and mis­sile attacks on a sove­reign sta­te take place, civi­li­an infra­struc­tu­re and pro­tec­ted cul­tu­ral sites are hit, and yet no effec­ti­ve coll­ec­ti­ve secu­ri­ty respon­se emer­ges. The very struc­tures that para­ly­ze diplo­ma­cy also allow the mili­ta­ry escala­ti­on to continue.

Taken tog­e­ther, the win­ter of 202526 marks a clear escala­ti­on in Russia’s air war against Ukraine – an air cam­paign that no lon­ger tar­gets only front‑line posi­ti­ons, but an enti­re socie­ty. Drones and mis­siles are being used as instru­ments of sys­te­ma­tic attri­ti­on – phy­si­cal­ly, infra­struc­tu­ral­ly and psy­cho­lo­gi­cal­ly – under the pro­tec­tion of a veto power that can shield its own war from real con­se­quen­ces. In an inter­na­tio­nal order whe­re veto hol­ders can block meaningful scru­ti­ny while waging high‑intensity wars against wea­k­er sta­tes, civi­li­ans in Ukrainian cities are left to bear most of the cost.

When this escala­ti­on over Ukraine is read next to the par­al­lel air war over Iran, a broa­der pic­tu­re emer­ges. In the win­ter of 202526, the United States and Russia – two rival veto powers – are both con­duc­ting large‑scale air cam­paigns against wea­k­er sta­tes, while using their Security Council pri­vi­le­ge to pre­vent meaningful scru­ti­ny or cons­traint. One war is fought with dro­nes and mis­siles over Ukrainian cities, the other with bombs and sanc­tions over Iran. Read tog­e­ther, the air war over Ukraine and the air war over Iran sug­gest that the win­ter of 202526 is not just ano­ther chap­ter in two sepa­ra­te con­flicts, but a test of whe­ther the inter­na­tio­nal sys­tem can res­train veto powers at all – or whe­ther they are now effec­tively free to wage high‑intensity wars against wea­k­er sta­tes with almost no exter­nal checks.

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