If Tehran Had Disarmed, It Would Now Be the Ukraine of the Middle East—and Would Be Begging Others for Weapons, Just as Ukraine Does

On the mor­ning of February 28, 2026, Tehran was shaken by explo­si­ons. The war had begun. Israel car­ri­ed out a large‑scale pre­emp­ti­ve strike on Iranian tar­gets, inclu­ding faci­li­ties near the offices of Ayatollah Ali Khamenei. According to Reuters, the ope­ra­ti­on had been plan­ned for months, coor­di­na­ted clo­se­ly with the United States, and its launch date was deci­ded weeks in advan­ce. Smoke rose over the capi­tal as impacts were repor­ted across the coun­try. Shortly after­ward, U.S. President Donald Trump announ­ced that the United States had begun “major com­bat ope­ra­ti­ons” against Iran and open­ly cal­led on the Iranian peo­p­le to “take their desti­ny into their own hands.” In that moment, the last mask of the inter­na­tio­nal order fell: the attack was not direc­ted at a bomb, but at the pos­si­bi­li­ty that a sta­te might refu­se enforced vulnerability.

The offi­ci­al jus­ti­fi­ca­ti­on from Washington and Tel Aviv is that Iran threa­tens the regi­on through its nuclear pro­gram, a nar­ra­ti­ve reflec­ted in report­ing by Al Jazeera on the strikes and the col­lap­se of nuclear talks. Parallel to the­se fai­led nego­tia­ti­ons, Trump open­ly lin­ked the attacks to the goal of regime chan­ge. The nuclear issue is the pre­text. The stra­te­gic truth is that an Iran with deter­rence would be uncontrollable—and that is pre­cis­e­ly what this order does not permit.

Ukraine has shown what hap­pens to sta­tes that give up their deter­rence. In 1994, it relin­quis­hed its nuclear wea­pons in exch­an­ge for secu­ri­ty gua­ran­tees that later pro­ved wort­hl­ess. Today it is mili­ta­ri­ly depen­dent on Western support—not becau­se it is weak, but becau­se it was dis­ar­med. Iran unders­tood this les­son. It accept­ed trans­pa­ren­cy but not dis­ar­ma­ment. It accept­ed nego­tia­ti­ons but not sub­or­di­na­ti­on. That is exact­ly why it was atta­cked. If Tehran had dis­ar­med, it would now be the Ukraine of the Middle East—and would be begging others for wea­pons, just as Ukraine does. This sen­tence is not a meta­phor. It is the archi­tec­tu­re of the inter­na­tio­nal order.

That archi­tec­tu­re is older than the cur­rent con­flict. It rea­ches back to 1945, when the vic­tors of World War II deci­ded who may be armed and who may not. Germany and Japan were demi­li­ta­ri­zed and remain­ed ful­ly depen­dent for deca­des. Libya aban­do­ned its nuclear pro­gram in 2003 and was over­thrown in 2011. Iraq had no wea­pons of mass des­truc­tion and was still inva­ded in 2003. North Korea, by con­trast, kept its program—and remains untoucha­ble to this day. The inter­na­tio­nal order does not reward dis­ar­ma­ment; it rewards deter­rence. It does not punish strength; it punis­hes vul­nerabi­li­ty. And it accepts sove­reig­n­ty only whe­re it remains controllable.

Israel laun­ched the strikes and declared they were aimed at “remo­ving exis­ten­ti­al thre­ats.” At the same time, Prime Minister Netanyahu spo­ke of “crea­ting the con­di­ti­ons for the Iranian peo­p­le to take their desti­ny into their own hands.” This is not a secu­ri­ty doc­tri­ne; it is a poli­ti­cal doc­tri­ne. Gaza was never the stra­te­gic core. Gaza was a side­show, a pres­su­re val­ve, a space of mana­ged escala­ti­on. The real axis of Israeli secu­ri­ty stra­tegy has for years run through Tehran, Damascus, and Beirut. Israel uses American power to secu­re its regio­nal domi­nan­ce. The United States uses Israeli inte­rests to enforce its glo­bal order. Both share one goal: an Iran wit­hout deterrence.

The strikes occur­red while the United States and Iran were still enga­ged in nego­tia­ti­ons. Both sides had held talks in February about the nuclear pro­gram, but Israel insis­ted that any agree­ment must include the com­ple­te dis­mant­ling of Iran’s nuclear infra­struc­tu­re. Iran refu­sed. It offe­red dia­lo­gue, but not self‑disarmament. The out­co­me was the­r­e­fo­re pre­de­ter­mi­ned. Diplomacy ends whe­re sove­reig­n­ty beg­ins. And the United States does not accept sove­reig­n­ty it can­not control.

The attacks hit govern­ment buil­dings in Tehran, faci­li­ties near Khamenei’s office, and mili­ta­ry infra­struc­tu­re across the coun­try. Iran imme­dia­te­ly respon­ded with mis­sile strikes on Israel and U.S. bases in the regi­on. Several sta­tes clo­sed their airspace. Israel declared a sta­te of emer­gen­cy. The United States announ­ced that “bombs will fall ever­y­whe­re.” This is not a limi­t­ed ope­ra­ti­on. It is a recon­fi­gu­ra­ti­on of the region’s power architecture.

But the deeper truth lies not in the explo­si­ons, but in what they reve­al: the inter­na­tio­nal order is not struc­tu­red by rules, but by the fear of powerful sta­tes that others might no lon­ger be coer­ced. Iran was not atta­cked becau­se it is dan­ge­rous. It was atta­cked becau­se it is not weak enough. It was not atta­cked becau­se it is buil­ding a bomb. Not only that, but it was atta­cked becau­se it refu­ses to live wit­hout deter­rence. It was not atta­cked becau­se diplo­ma­cy fai­led. Diplomacy fai­led becau­se the United States and Israel do not accept an order in which Iran remains sovereign.

This war is not direc­ted at a wea­pon. It is direc­ted at the pos­si­bi­li­ty of say­ing no. And that is why it is not only an attack on Iran but an attack on the very idea of sove­reig­n­ty its­elf. It does not mark the end of a con­flict, but the begin­ning of a new world order in which deter­rence is the only lan­guage power respects and in which sta­tes are punis­hed not for what they do, but for their independence.

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