The Political System of Poverty

Kombinati Metalurgjik in Elbasan illustrating Albania’s political system of poverty and industrial decline
The Kombinati Metalurgjik in Elbasan, once a symbol of Albania’s industrial ambitions, now reflects the country’s shift toward raw‑material exports and declining production capacity.
This ent­ry is part 1 of 2 in the series Global Power Structures

Global Power Structures 

Kombinati Metalurgjik in Elbasan illustrating Albania’s political system of poverty and industrial decline

The Political System of Poverty 

- Between EU praise and mass emigration: What remains of democracy?

Democracy Without a People: Albania’s 35-Year Experiment and Europe’s Blind Mirror 

A Country in Descent 

Since 2013, the govern­ment of Edi Rama has stee­red Albania into a struc­tu­ral decli­ne. Thirteen years should be enough to sta­bi­li­ze an eco­no­my, streng­then insti­tu­ti­ons, and deli­ver visi­ble deve­lo­p­ment. Instead, the coun­try moves down­ward with the pre­dic­ta­bi­li­ty of an air­craft on auto­pi­lot. Citizens sit in the back of the cabin, unable to influence the direc­tion, reassu­red only by a demo­cra­cy that imi­ta­tes legi­ti­ma­cy but pro­du­ces no progress. 

This rea­li­ty rai­ses a direct ques­ti­on. Does the govern­ment lack eco­no­mic com­pe­tence, or does it fol­low a deli­be­ra­te poli­ti­cal logic? And if it fol­lows a deli­be­ra­te logic, who­se inte­rests does this model ser­ve? A deca­de in power gives any govern­ment enough time to trans­form a country—or to keep it dependent. 

The European Union rein­forces the illu­si­on of pro­gress by pro­mo­ting 2027 as a poten­ti­al acces­si­on date. The pro­mi­se signals sta­bi­li­ty, even as Albania’s eco­no­mic struc­tu­re wea­k­ens year after year. International data expo­ses the gap bet­ween appearance and rea­li­ty. The World Bank records mode­st growth dri­ven main­ly by remit­tances rather than dome­stic pro­duc­tion (World Bank, Remittances as % of GDP), while the Albanian Institute of Statistics (INSTAT) reports an annu­al trade defi­cit of –4.29 bil­li­on USD. The pat­tern is unmist­aka­ble: Albania pro­du­ces too litt­le, imports too much, and reli­es on inco­me ear­ned abroad. The coun­try extra­cts the resour­ces while Europe cap­tures the value. A model that exports raw mate­ri­als chea­p­ly and imports finis­hed goods at high pri­ces can­not build natio­nal deve­lo­p­ment; it streng­thens for­eign indus­tries and locks the coun­try at the bot­tom of the value chain. When a govern­ment main­ta­ins such a model for more than a deca­de, the ques­ti­on of who­se inte­rests it ser­ves beco­mes unavo­ida­ble, becau­se it cer­tain­ly does not ser­ve the popu­la­ti­on, which car­ri­es the los­ses while others coll­ect the gains.

A Rich Country Kept Poor 

Albania holds valuable resour­ces: chro­mi­um, cop­per, nickel, oil, fer­ti­le land, and water. Yet com­pa­nies ship the­se resour­ces out of the coun­try in their lowest-value form—raw and bare­ly processed.

Extraction does not crea­te value; only pro­ces­sing, refi­ne­ment, and indus­tri­al trans­for­ma­ti­on do. Without dome­stic pro­ces­sing, a coun­try remains at the bot­tom of the value chain, whe­re pro­fits stay small and deve­lo­p­ment never takes off.

Albania exports raw mate­ri­als and imports finis­hed goods, a pat­tern that drains value crea­ti­on, blocks pro­duc­ti­ve capa­ci­ty, and pre­vents the emer­gence of indus­tri­al sec­tors (OEC, Albania Export & Import Profile). This is not deve­lo­p­ment; it is a mecha­nism that sys­te­ma­ti­cal­ly repro­du­ces dependency.

Why Albania Stays Poor—and Saudi Arabia Does Not 

Exporting raw mate­ri­als does not deci­de whe­ther a coun­try beco­mes rich or poor. Saudi Arabia also exports raw materials—but under enti­re­ly dif­fe­rent conditions. 

Saudi Arabia con­trols the full chain of value creation—from refi­ne­ries and petro­che­mi­cals to ener­gy indus­tries and sove­reign wealth funds—allowing it to export both cru­de oil and refi­ned pro­ducts while reinves­t­ing its pro­fits in infra­struc­tu­re, tech­no­lo­gy, and glo­bal assets.

Albania fol­lows the oppo­si­te path. It exports low‑value raw mate­ri­als and imports high‑value finis­hed goods. Foreign indus­tries gene­ra­te the pro­fit, not Albania. 

Saudi Arabia grows wealt­hy despi­te tourism. 

Albania stays poor becau­se it tre­ats tou­rism as a sub­sti­tu­te for industry. 

The Tourism Myth 

The govern­ment pres­ents tou­rism as a natio­nal stra­tegy. But tou­rism com­ple­ments an eco­no­my; it does not anchor one. It crea­tes sea­so­nal jobs, low wages, and high import depen­den­cy. It does not build an indus­tri­al base, tech­no­lo­gi­cal capa­ci­ty, or export goods. 

A hotel con­su­mes. A fac­to­ry produces. 

Consumption brings short‑term reve­nue. Production crea­tes long‑term wealth. GDP mea­su­res acti­vi­ty, but pro­spe­ri­ty grows only when a coun­try exports value ins­tead of import­ing it. A trade defi­cit reve­als an eco­no­my that pro­du­ces too litt­le and con­su­mes too much—and Albania embo­dies this struc­tu­ral imbalance.

The billion‑dollar hotel pro­ject on Sazan Island, finan­ced by Qatar and inves­tors lin­ked to the Trump orbit, illus­tra­tes the pat­tern. Capital flows to places whe­re inves­tors expect quick returns, not long‑term value creation. 

No coun­try has built pro­spe­ri­ty through hotels. 

The Myth of Capitalism 

Many Albanians hear that the sta­te can­not crea­te com­pa­nies or pro­vi­de jobs, and that indi­vi­du­als must “invest on their own.” This belief con­fu­ses capi­ta­lism with sta­te absence. 

Capitalism requi­res the sta­te to crea­te struc­tu­ral con­di­ti­ons. Only when the sta­te gua­ran­tees the­se foun­da­ti­ons can pri­va­te enter­pri­se emer­ge, grow, and invest. 

Countries like Germany, South Korea, the United States, Japan, France, and Singapore did not lea­ve their indus­tries to chan­ce; they built them by gua­ran­te­e­ing legal secu­ri­ty, sta­ble ener­gy sup­p­ly, func­tio­ning courts, infra­struc­tu­re, edu­ca­ti­on, invest­ment incen­ti­ves, and cor­rup­ti­on con­trol. Without the­se foun­da­ti­ons, neither citi­zens nor for­eign inves­tors com­mit capi­tal. Albania, by con­trast, demands entre­pre­neu­ri­al beha­vi­or from its citi­zens while refu­sing to crea­te the con­di­ti­ons that make entre­pre­neur­ship pos­si­ble. It offers capi­ta­lism wit­hout a foun­da­ti­on, a mar­ket wit­hout struc­tu­re, and com­pe­ti­ti­on wit­hout rules. As long as the sta­te avo­ids buil­ding the con­di­ti­ons for pro­duc­tion, the out­co­me remains the same: com­pa­nies ship out raw mate­ri­als, and no indus­try emerges.

This is not a poli­ti­cal opi­ni­on. It fol­lows eco­no­mic logic. 

The Political Logic Behind Albania’s Economic Weakness 

Albania does not lack wealth; poli­ti­cal decis­i­ons keep it poor by blo­cking value crea­ti­on and rein­for­cing a model that exports raw mate­ri­als, imports value, and streng­thens exter­nal inte­rests at the expen­se of the popu­la­ti­on. The mecha­nism is simp­le: a coun­try that exports only raw mate­ri­als loses capi­tal, know­ledge, jobs, and its future, becau­se wit­hout pro­duc­tion, no sec­tors rise, inno­va­ti­on stalls, and eco­no­mic inde­pen­dence never emer­ges. Albania’s weak­ne­ss, the­r­e­fo­re, does not ari­se from the com­pe­tence of indi­vi­du­al minis­ters but from a poli­ti­cal logic that rewards short‑term gains, secu­res loyal­ty, and repro­du­ces depen­den­cy, while powerful actors sus­tain the old colo­ni­al nar­ra­ti­ve that Southeastern count­ries can­not build modern economies—even though histo­ry con­sis­t­ent­ly dis­pro­ves it. South Korea, Singapore, Estonia, and Finland all trans­for­med them­sel­ves through poli­ti­cal decis­i­ons, insti­tu­tio­nal reform, and indus­tri­al stra­tegy, not through geo­gra­phy or cul­tu­ral desti­ny. Albania remains weak for the same reason: not becau­se the regi­on lacks capa­ci­ty, but becau­se the poli­ti­cal model refu­ses to build pro­duc­tion, avo­ids indus­tri­al deve­lo­p­ment, and prio­ri­ti­zes extra­c­tion over trans­for­ma­ti­on. Those who pro­fit from cheap resour­ces, poli­ti­cal con­trol, and struc­tu­ral depen­den­cy have no incen­ti­ve to chan­ge it, and the model endu­res as long as their inte­rests out­weigh the will for eco­no­mic transformation. 

Explore more ana­ly­ses in our Hidden Geopolitics cate­go­ry.

Read more in our ana­ly­ses on Greenland’s colo­ni­al lega­cy and on how the 1945 world order pro­du­ces today’s wars.

Global Power Structures

Democracy Without a People: Albania’s 35-Year Experiment and Europe’s Blind Mirror