When War and “Peace” Become Private Decisions: Trump’s Iran War, Gaza’s “Board of Peace” and the Power of Article 27

Donald Trump and Benjamin Netanyahu together at Mar‑a‑Lago, symbolizing their joint control over the Iran war and Gaza “peace” decisions.

US President Donald Trump has made it clear that ending the war against Iran is not a mat­ter for inter­na­tio­nal law, but a joint decis­i­on with Benjamin Netanyahu. In Gaza, he sells a billion‑dollar “Board of Peace” as a peace pro­ject, which has also been scru­ti­ni­zed in depth by the New York Times. Taken tog­e­ther, the­se two cases show how far the prac­ti­ce of war‑making and “peace manage­ment” has drifted away from the idea of coll­ec­ti­ve security—and how much Article 27 of the UN Charter enables this.

A “Mutual Decision” With Netanyahu: How the Iran War Is Supposed to End

On March 8, 2026, Trump told seve­ral out­lets that the timing of the end of the war with Iran would be a “mutu­al” or “joint” decis­i­on with Israel’s Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu. US News, Times of Israel, ANI In one inter­view, he said he would deci­de “at the right time” but that this decis­i­on would be shared becau­se the United States and Israel were acting tog­e­ther. Reuters He also clai­med that the two count­ries had “des­troy­ed a coun­try that wan­ted to des­troy Israel”—language that sug­gests not just the tar­ge­ting of spe­ci­fic capa­bi­li­ties, but the sys­te­ma­tic crus­hing of a sta­te. ANI

This shifts the ques­ti­on of war and peace away from the sphe­re of the United Nations and into a very small room: Washington and Jerusalem. The UN Security Council, inter­na­tio­nal norms, or regio­nal orga­niza­ti­ons bare­ly appear in Trump’s framing. The Iran war beco­mes a sche­du­led ope­ra­ti­on bet­ween two allies who deci­de among them­sel­ves when “enough” has been des­troy­ed. CFR con­flict tracker

Gaza as a Business Model: The “Board of Peace”

The way Trump talks about Gaza sounds very different—and yet fol­lows the same logic. In January 2026, he unvei­led the so‑called “Board of Peace,” a body meant to over­see the recon­s­truc­tion and “sta­bi­liza­ti­on” of the devas­ta­ted Gaza Strip. CNN PBS NYT

Key facts:

  • A US$1 bil­li­on cash con­tri­bu­ti­on secu­res a per­ma­nent seat on the Board of Peace; sta­tes that pay less can only obtain tem­po­ra­ry, three‑year seats. CNN PBS
  • Trump hims­elf has pled­ged US$10 bil­li­on, while other govern­ments and pri­va­te backers have repor­ted­ly pro­mi­sed around US$5–7 bil­li­on in total. Washington Post DW PBS
  • The Board is sup­po­sed to make decis­i­ons on secu­ri­ty arran­ge­ments, demi­li­ta­riza­ti­on and large‑scale recon­s­truc­tion fun­ding in a ter­ri­to­ry whe­re rough­ly 80% of buil­dings in Gaza have been des­troy­ed after near­ly two years of war. NYT
  • According to report­ing by the New York Times and PBS, a UN Security Council reso­lu­ti­on in late 2025 endor­sed Trump’s 20‑point plan for Gaza and reco­gni­zed the Board of Peace as a cen­tral hub for recon­s­truc­tion and secu­ri­ty.NYT PBS But the gover­nan­ce remains hea­vi­ly US‑dominated: Trump chairs the board; Palestinian repre­sen­ta­ti­on is limi­t­ed; and Israel has been able to veto cer­tain poten­ti­al mem­bers, such as Turkey and Qatar, even though they are expec­ted to con­tri­bu­te money.CNN NYT explai­ner
  • More recent report­ing from Gaza under­lines how con­tes­ted this struc­tu­re is. Local voices descri­be the Board less as a life­line and more as a distant, eli­te pro­ject: peo­p­le living among the ruins say they see pled­ges and head­lines, but litt­le cla­ri­ty on who will actual­ly deci­de which neigh­bor­hoods are rebuilt first or how quick­ly money will reach tho­se who lost ever­y­thing. National Today Responsible Statecraft NYT follow‑up
  • Even the most opti­mi­stic esti­ma­tes sug­gest that the Board’s cur­rent pledges—roughly US$5–7 billion—cover only a frac­tion of what UN agen­ci­es say Gaza will need for recon­s­truc­tion, with some esti­ma­tes rea­ching US$40–70 bil­li­on. NYT

Critics the­r­e­fo­re warn that the Board of Peace risks beco­ming a par­al­lel struc­tu­re to the UN, con­trol­led by money and geo­po­li­ti­cal levera­ge rather than by demo­cra­tic or local legi­ti­ma­cy. Responsible Statecraft National Today In Gaza, mas­si­ve des­truc­tion is fol­lo­wed by a “peace board” who­se seats can lite­ral­ly be bought. In the Iran war, Trump announ­ces that the end of the bom­bing will be nego­tia­ted bila­te­ral­ly with Netanyahu. In both cases, con­trol over war and “peace” rests in the same hands.

Veto Power Instead of Collective Security: The Role of Article 27

This con­cen­tra­ti­on of power is not just a Trump phe­no­me­non. It is enab­led by the basic struc­tu­re of the United Nations—above all, by Article 27 of the UN Charter, which governs voting in the Security Council. UN Charter full text UNSC veto explainer

Article 27 sti­pu­la­tes that for all sub­stan­ti­ve decis­i­ons of the UN Security Council—sanctions, peace­kee­ping man­da­tes, aut­ho­riza­ti­ons of force—two con­di­ti­ons must be met: at least nine mem­bers must vote in favor, and the five per­ma­nent members—the United States, Russia, China, the United Kingdom, and France—must all con­cur or at least not veto the decis­i­on. UN Repertory. UN Repertory

In prac­ti­ce, this gives each of the five per­ma­nent mem­bers a veto. A sin­gle “no” from any one of them can block any reso­lu­ti­on, even if the rest of the world sup­ports it. History of the veto For deca­des, sta­tes in the General Assembly, NGOs and inter­na­tio­nal law scho­lars have cri­ti­ci­zed this veto sys­tem as a cen­tral obs­ta­cle to genui­ne coll­ec­ti­ve secu­ri­ty.UN GA deba­te aca­de­mic cri­tique obli­ga­to­ry abst­en­ti­on artic­le From Syria to Gaza, from Russia’s inva­si­on of Ukraine to the cur­rent war against Iran, the pat­tern keeps repea­ting: when­ever a reso­lu­ti­on threa­tens the core inte­rests of a veto power or its clo­se allies, it can be delay­ed, wate­red down or kil­led altog­e­ther.veto histo­ry

A recent emer­gen­cy ses­si­on of the UN Security Council on the Iran strikes ended with no bin­ding reso­lu­ti­on, as the United States and Israel stiff-armed attempts to put real cons­traints on their campaign—another exam­p­le of how the veto and its shadow can turn the Council into a spec­ta­tor. Fortune UN stake­out video

This is whe­re the Gaza and Iran examp­les con­nect direct­ly to Article 27: in Gaza and in the Iran war, the United States is eit­her a direct mili­ta­ry actor (Iran) or the main pro­tec­tor of a key mili­ta­ry play­er (Israel). CFR As a veto power, Washington can block or shape Security Council initia­ti­ves that do not fit its strategy—and then build its own gover­nan­ce struc­tures like the Board of Peace to mana­ge the after­math. NYT Responsible Statecraft In other words, the same actor can be a war par­ty, a gate­kee­per at the UN, and the archi­tect of the “peace” order that follows.

A Warning to Other States—and Why Article 27 Has to Fall

For other sta­tes that dream of stra­te­gic auto­no­my, deter­rence or regio­nal influence, this is a blunt war­ning. Any attempt to build inde­pen­dent mili­ta­ry or tech­no­lo­gi­cal power that shifts the balan­ce of forces risks tur­ning a coun­try into a “secu­ri­ty pro­blem” in the eyes of the veto powers. Iran, Gaza and ear­lier con­flicts show how quick­ly such cases are no lon­ger pri­ma­ri­ly deci­ded bet­ween tho­se on the ground, but in Washington, Beijing and Moscow—with London and Paris sit­ting at the table but rare­ly rewri­ting the rules. CFR

The plan­ned Xi–Trump sum­mit in Beijing, set against the back­drop of the ongo­ing Iran war, unders­cores this rea­li­ty. While Iran is being bom­bed, the United States and China are pre­pa­ring a mee­ting offi­ci­al­ly focu­sed on trade fric­tions, the tech war and Taiwan, with the Iran con­flict appearing most­ly as a com­pli­ca­ting fac­tor to be “mana­ged.”Reuters ana­ly­sis CNN Wang Yi When Trump says that ending the war will be a “mutu­al decis­i­on” with Netanyahu, he is not just describ­ing his per­so­nal style. He is describ­ing the func­tio­ning out­co­me of the veto logic: tho­se who wage the war deci­de when and how it ends.

As long as Article 27 remains unch­an­ged, this is not an accident—it is the sys­tem. A handful of sta­tes retain the right to wage wars, to block peace initia­ti­ves at the UN, and then to install their own “solu­ti­ons,” whe­ther they are cal­led a Board of Peace or some­thing else. veto histo­ry UN GA deba­te If glo­bal secu­ri­ty is to be more than risk manage­ment by the powerful, cos­me­tic reforms will not be enough. Article 27 has to fall, or be fun­da­men­tal­ly rewrit­ten, so that war‑making sta­tes can no lon­ger pro­tect their own wars from scru­ti­ny with a veto. Otherwise we will keep living in exact­ly the world your March spe­cial issue alre­a­dy names: equal power—or end­less wars.

If you want to under­stand what a world bey­ond Article 27 could look like, you can explo­re the Equalismus theo­ry and its pro­po­sals for a new glo­bal order wit­hout veto power: learn more about Equalismus in our in‑depth ana­ly­sis “Why Equalism Breaks With Marx: Equal Capital Is Not Equal Power”, read and purcha­se the 100‑page spe­cial edi­ti­on “Equal Power or Endless Wars?” with data, war time­lines, and UN veto ana­ly­sis, and get the full Equalismus Book Manifest – a por­ti­on of the pro­ceeds sup­ports the move­ment to abo­lish Article 27 of the UN Charter and you can sign the Equalismus Manifest at the end of the page on: https://​inju​s​ti​ce​chro​nic​le​.com/​e​q​u​a​l​i​s​m​us/

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