The real crisis behind the Trump tariffs: the power inequality shaping the global order

A large Evergreen cargo ship at the Port of Baltimore, symbolizing global trade tensions and the impact of Trump tariffs on international power inequality

World leaders respond with concern to Trump’s decision to raise global tariffs from 10% to 15%. But concern and appeals to stability are not a strategy. The world still refuses to confront the simple truth: power inequality is the root of instability, conflict, and economic coercion.

Trump’s move expo­ses a struc­tu­ral weak­ne­ss that rea­ches far bey­ond the United States. Courts can set limits, but they can­not defend them. A Supreme Court ruling loses its force the moment a pre­si­dent deci­des to cir­cum­vent it poli­ti­cal­ly. That is exact­ly what hap­pen­ed. The tariffs were declared unlawful and imme­dia­te­ly repla­ced with new mea­su­res that achie­ve the same effect. The American sepa­ra­ti­on of powers now exists more as a prin­ci­ple than as a func­tio­ning rea­li­ty. And if one of the world’s oldest demo­cra­ci­es can no lon­ger gua­ran­tee its insti­tu­tio­nal safe­guards, this is not an American anoma­ly. It is a glo­bal warning.

The structural fragility of checks and balances

Checks and balan­ces only work when the exe­cu­ti­ve is wil­ling to res­train its­elf. Once poli­ti­cal power beco­mes stron­ger than the insti­tu­ti­ons meant to con­tain it, the sys­tem beco­mes unsta­ble. Courts can issue rulings, but they can­not enforce them. As Alexander Hamilton wro­te in Federalist No. 78, the judi­cia­ry has “neither force nor will, but mere­ly judgment.” They have no exe­cu­ti­ve power, no inde­pen­dent instru­ments to gua­ran­tee compliance.

When a pre­si­dent igno­res a ruling, uses alter­na­ti­ve legal pathways to con­ti­nue the same poli­cy, or delays, dilutes, or poli­ti­cal­ly neu­tra­li­zes imple­men­ta­ti­on, the imba­lan­ce beco­mes visi­ble. The sta­bi­li­ty of the sys­tem depends not on law, but on self‑discipline.

If this can hap­pen in one of the world’s oldest demo­cra­ci­es, what does it mean for sta­tes with wea­k­er insti­tu­ti­ons? How are they sup­po­sed to resist the tempt­a­ti­on to place power abo­ve law?

The political psychology of power asymmetry

Power ine­qua­li­ty is not only struc­tu­ral; it is psy­cho­lo­gi­cal. It shapes expec­ta­ti­ons, per­cep­ti­ons, and beha­vi­or across every poli­ti­cal system.

Where power is con­cen­tra­ted, the belief emer­ges that rules are nego­tia­ble. Those who repea­ted­ly expe­ri­ence the absence of con­se­quen­ces begin to see this not as an excep­ti­on, but as nor­ma­li­ty. Power pro­du­ces the fee­ling of stan­ding abo­ve the rules.

On the other side, the oppo­si­te dyna­mic unfolds. Weaker actors inter­na­li­ze their power­less­ness. They lower their expec­ta­ti­ons, redu­ce their demands, and accept ine­qua­li­ty as an unch­an­geable rea­li­ty. Political power­less­ness beco­mes psy­cho­lo­gi­cal adapt­a­ti­on; adapt­a­ti­on beco­mes resi­gna­ti­on. Inequality beco­mes not only tole­ra­ted, but normalized.

Between the­se poles, a cli­ma­te of dis­trust grows. Weaker sta­tes do not belie­ve in the neu­tra­li­ty of inter­na­tio­nal insti­tu­ti­ons becau­se they know decis­i­ons are shaped by power inte­rests. Powerful sta­tes dis­trust rules that might cons­train them. Both sides act not from coope­ra­ti­on, but from cau­ti­on. Neither expects fair­ness; both expect advantage‑seeking.

These psy­cho­lo­gi­cal dyna­mics are the invi­si­ble engi­ne of glo­bal insta­bi­li­ty. They ero­de trust, block genui­ne coope­ra­ti­on, and turn inter­na­tio­nal rules into sel­ec­ti­ve tools. In a world whe­re power is uneven­ly dis­tri­bu­ted, every insti­tu­ti­on beco­mes fra­gi­le, every agree­ment pre­ca­rious, and every diplo­ma­tic solu­ti­on only as sta­ble as the inte­rests of the powerful who tole­ra­te it.

Why diplomacy fails when power is unequal

Diplomacy claims equa­li­ty among sta­tes, but in rea­li­ty, power ine­qua­li­ty deter­mi­nes the out­co­me of poli­ti­cal con­flicts. Rules, trea­ties, and moral appeals lose their mea­ning the moment they con­tra­dict the inte­rests of the powerful.

The war in Ukraine makes this bru­t­ally clear. Diplomatic appeals neither pre­ven­ted the war nor ended it. Military, eco­no­mic, and geo­po­li­ti­cal power rela­ti­ons shape every opti­on. States wit­hout suf­fi­ci­ent power can nego­tia­te, warn, and appeal—but they can­not com­pel. Their diplo­ma­cy is sym­bo­lic becau­se it lacks struc­tu­ral force.

The same pat­tern defi­nes the glo­bal eco­no­my. Trade rules are writ­ten by the stron­gest eco­no­mies. Tariffs and sanc­tions func­tion as poli­ti­cal pres­su­re tools. Global sup­p­ly chains repro­du­ce depen­den­ci­es that keep enti­re regi­ons struc­tu­ral­ly weak. These depen­den­ci­es are not acci­den­tal; they are the pro­duct of a world order that not only tole­ra­tes power ine­qua­li­ty but sys­te­ma­ti­cal­ly rein­forces it.

Diplomacy can­not cor­rect the­se ine­qua­li­ties. At best, it can mana­ge them—and only as long as the powerful allow it.

In a world of une­qual power, diplo­ma­cy beco­mes a ritu­al wit­hout enforce­ment. It does not resol­ve con­flicts; it post­po­nes them. It does not crea­te sta­bi­li­ty; it pro­longs the illu­si­on of sta­bi­li­ty. And it can­not pro­tect an order desi­gned to pri­vi­le­ge the strong and keep the weak dependent.

The economic mechanisms of dependency

Economic depen­den­cy is not acci­den­tal. It is the result of an archi­tec­tu­re desi­gned and enforced by the world’s stron­gest eco­no­mies. Markets are not neu­tral; they are poli­ti­cal spaces shaped by trade agree­ments, tariffs, sub­si­dies, and stan­dards that reflect the inte­rests of the powerful. Those who wri­te the rules con­trol the mar­gins of action for ever­yo­ne else. This dyna­mic is exten­si­ve­ly docu­men­ted in UNCTAD’s Trade and Development Report, which shows how glo­bal trade rules sys­te­ma­ti­cal­ly reflect the inte­rests of domi­nant economies.

Dependency crea­tes vul­nerabi­li­ty. When a coun­try reli­es on spe­ci­fic imports or exports, eco­no­mic pres­su­re beco­mes poli­ti­cal pres­su­re. The line bet­ween trade and coer­ci­on blurs. States wit­hout access to capi­tal, tech­no­lo­gy, or mar­kets remain struc­tu­ral­ly weak—and the­r­e­fo­re poli­ti­cal­ly mal­leable. Inequality is not only repro­du­ced; it is sta­bi­li­zed. It beco­mes the foun­da­ti­on of inter­na­tio­nal relations.

These mecha­nisms show that eco­no­mic ine­qua­li­ty is not an eco­no­mic detail but a poli­ti­cal foun­da­ti­on. It crea­tes the con­di­ti­ons under which insta­bi­li­ty beco­mes ine­vi­ta­ble: tho­se who are depen­dent can­not act free­ly; tho­se who can­not act free­ly can­not avo­id con­flict; and tho­se who can­not avo­id con­flict live in an order that does not pro­tect them but expo­ses them.

Historical patterns of power inequality

History shows with relent­less con­sis­ten­cy that power ine­qua­li­ty pro­du­ces the same out­co­mes across eras.

Colonialism crea­ted poli­ti­cal and eco­no­mic struc­tures that insti­tu­tio­na­li­zed ine­qua­li­ty: bor­ders drawn, resour­ces extra­c­ted, socie­ties stra­ti­fied. Power was con­cen­tra­ted in the hands of a few; the con­se­quen­ces were bor­ne by many. The end of colo­ni­al empires did not end the pat­tern; it mere­ly chan­ged its form.

During the Cold War, sta­tes were trea­ted not accor­ding to their inte­rests but accor­ding to their stra­te­gic uti­li­ty. Countries in Africa, Asia, and Latin America beca­me are­nas of pro­xy logic, whe­re their own needs were secon­da­ry. Those who fit the gre­at powers’ stra­te­gic cal­cu­lus were sup­port­ed; tho­se who did not were igno­red or desta­bi­li­zed. Power ine­qua­li­ty dro­ve con­flict and pre­ven­ted solutions.

In the glo­ba­li­zed pre­sent, the pat­tern con­ti­nues. Markets, insti­tu­ti­ons, and secu­ri­ty archi­tec­tures are shaped by sta­tes with the grea­test resour­ces. International orga­niza­ti­ons can act only within the boun­da­ries set by the powerful. Trade regimes, cre­dit con­di­ti­ons, secu­ri­ty alliances—all fol­low the logic of influence, not equa­li­ty. Those with power defi­ne the rules; tho­se wit­hout power must obey them.

Across all eras, the prin­ci­ple remains the same:
Where power is con­cen­tra­ted, arbi­trar­i­ne­ss and insta­bi­li­ty emer­ge.
Where power is absent, depen­den­cy and vul­nerabi­li­ty fol­low.
Where power is une­qual, rules are not applied—they are adjus­ted to pre­ser­ve the exis­ting order.

Instability is not an acci­dent. It is the logi­cal con­se­quence of a world whe­re power is con­cen­tra­ted rather than distributed—and whe­re ine­qua­li­ty is not reco­gni­zed as a pro­blem but accept­ed as a structure.

The world stands at a turning point

World lea­ders respond to Trump’s tariffs with con­cern, appeals, and diplo­ma­tic lan­guage. But con­cern does not chan­ge power rela­ti­ons. It soot­hes, it obscu­res, it delays—but it resol­ves nothing.

As long as power remains uneven­ly dis­tri­bu­ted, rulings will be igno­red, rules will be bro­ken, diplo­ma­cy will be inef­fec­ti­ve, and insta­bi­li­ty will beco­me the norm. The ques­ti­on is no lon­ger whe­ther the cur­rent order will hold, but how long it can with­stand the pres­su­res it has created.

A new glo­bal order is not an idea­li­stic vision—it is a struc­tu­ral neces­si­ty. An order that tre­ats power equa­li­ty not as a moral aspi­ra­ti­on but as the pre­con­di­ti­on for peace, sta­bi­li­ty, and jus­ti­ce. An order in which insti­tu­ti­ons do not depend on the good­will of the powerful. An order in which rules do not app­ly only to the weak. An order built not on appeals, but on equal capa­ci­ty to act.

Until such an order exists, the world will con­ti­nue to expe­ri­ence what it expe­ri­en­ces today: power over­ri­ding law, inte­rests over­ri­ding diplo­ma­cy, and insta­bi­li­ty emer­ging as the ine­vi­ta­ble out­co­me of a world that accepts power ine­qua­li­ty ins­tead of over­co­ming it.

Equalism—the theoretical foundation

This ana­ly­sis is groun­ded in the core for­mu­la of Equalism, which I deve­lo­ped in my mani­festo: true jus­ti­ce ari­ses from equa­li­ty of power, not equa­li­ty of capital.

The full theo­ry is pre­sen­ted in the Equalism Manifesto, available on Kindle.

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